



# **Code Reuse Attacks in PHP: Automated POP Chain Generation**

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## 1. Code Reuse Attacks in PHP

- Code reuse attacks are known for memory corruption vulnerabilities
- They base on reusing existing code fragments
- Also a viable attack vector against PHP applications
- First demonstrated by Stefan Esser, 2009
- Using a *PHP Object Injection* (POI) vulnerability to trigger gadget chains




WORDPRESS

(23.2% of all websites)




Joomla!™

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## 1.1 PHP's (De)Serialization

- PHP built-in functions  
`serialize()` / `unserialize()`
- Transform any data type  
to an unified string format
- Allows to store PHP values  
without loosing the structure



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## 1.1 PHP's (De)Serialization


- PHP built-in functions  
`serialize()` / `unserialize()`
- Transform any data type  
to an unified string format
- Allows to store PHP values  
without loosing the structure

```
1 class Text {
2     public function __construct($data) {
3         $this->data = $data;
4     }
5 }
6
7 $object1 = new Text('CCS14');
8 $string = serialize($object1);
```

```
O:4:"Text":1:{s:4:"data";s:5:"CCS14";}
```

```
9 $object2 = unserialize($string);
10 echo $object2->data;
```

```
CCS14
```



## 1.2 PHP Object Injection

- *PHP Object Injection (POI)*  
Vulnerability occurs when user data is `unserialize`'d

```
1 class Text {
2     public function __construct($data) {
3         $this->data = $data;
4     }
5 }
6
7 $object1 = new Text('CCS14');
8 $_COOKIE['text'] = serialize($object1);
```

```
O:4:"Text":1:{s:4:"data";s:5:"CCS14";}
```

```
9 $object2 = unserialize($_COOKIE['text']);
10 echo $object2->data;
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```
CCS14
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## 1.2 PHP Object Injection

- *PHP Object Injection (POI)*  
Vulnerability occurs when user data is `unserialize`'d
- Attacker can inject arbitrary data types and values
- Severity depends on flow of injected data and *gadgets*

```
1 class Text {
2     public function __construct($data) {
3         $this->data = $data;
4     }
5 }
6
7 $object1 = new Text('CCS14');
8 $_COOKIE['text'] = serialize($object1);
```

```
O:4:"Text":1:{s:4:"data";s:5:"CCS14";}
O:6:"FooBar":1:{s:4:"data";s:3:"XSS"};
```


```
9 $object2 = unserialize($_COOKIE['text']);
10 echo $object2->data;
```

XSS



## 1.3 Magic Methods

- 15 special purpose methods starting with `__`
- For example `__construct()`, `__destruct()`, `__toString()`, `__wakeup()`, `__isset()`
- Some magic methods are invoked **automatically** on deserialization !



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
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```
9  $object2 = unserialize($_COOKIE['text']);  
10  
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
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- For example `__construct()`, `__destruct()`, `__toString()`, `__wakeup()`, `__isset()`
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```
1 class TempFile {
2
3     ...
4     public function __destruct() {
5         unlink($this->file);
6     }
7     ...
8 }
```

```
O:4:"Text":1:{s:4:"data";s:5:"CCS14";}
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
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```

```
O:4:"Text":1:{s:4:"data";s:5:"CCS14";}
O:8:"TempFile":1:{s:4:"file";s:9:".htaccess";}
```

```
9 $object2 = unserialize($_COOKIE['text']);
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11     ...
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
## 1.3 Magic Methods

- 15 special purpose methods starting with `__`
- For example `__construct()`, `__destruct()`, `__toString()`, `__wakeup()`, `__isset()`
- Some magic methods are invoked on specific **events**

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7     ...
8 }
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O:4:"Text":1:{s:4:"data";s:5:"CCS14";}
O:8:"TempFile":1:{s:4:"file";s:9:".htaccess";}
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```
9 $object2 = unserialize($_COOKIE['text']);
10 if(isset($object2)) {
11     ...
```



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
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## 1.4 Property Oriented Programming

- Magic methods are the *initial gadgets*
- They might call other methods (*gadgets*)
- We control all properties

```
1 class TempFile {
2     public function __destruct() {
3         $this->shutdown();
4     }
5     public function shutdown() {
6         $this->handle->close();
7     }
8 }
```

```
1 class Process {
2     public function close() {
3         system('kill ' . $this->pid);
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O:8:"TempFile":0:{};
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
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7     }
8 }
```

Process Object

```
1 class Process {
2     public function close() {
3         system('kill ' . $this->pid);
4     }
5 }
```

```
0:8:"TempFile":1:{
  s:5:"handle";0:7:"Process":0:{};
};
```



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```
O:8:"TempFile":1:{  
  s:5:"handle";O:7:"Process":1:{  
    s:3:"pid";s:10:";touch ccs"  
  };  
};
```

```
1 class TempFile {  
2     public function __destruct() {  
3         $this->shutdown();  
4     }  
5     public function shutdown() {  
6         $this->handle->close();  
7     }  
8 }
```

Process Object

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1 class Process {  
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
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    s:3:"pid";s:10:";touch ccs"  
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};
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Process Object

```
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2     public function close() {  
3         system('kill ' . $this->pid);  
4     }  
5 }
```

kill ;touch ccs




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## 1.5 POI Vulnerability Examples

CVE	Software	Version	Severity
CVE-2014-2294	Open Web Analytics	1.5.6	unknown
CVE-2014-1860	Contao CMS	3.2.4	PHP Code Execution
CVE-2014-0334	CMS Made Simple	1.11.9	unknown
CVE-2013-4338	Wordpress	3.5.1	unknown
CVE-2013-1465	CubeCart	5.2.0	SQL injection
CVE-2013-1453	Joomla!	3.0.2	SQL injection, File Delete




## 1.6 Our Approach

- Static code analysis for PHP code
- Automatically detect POI vulnerabilities
- Automatically generate POP gadget chains
- Extend prototype using *block* and *function summaries*
- Challenge: modeling object-oriented PHP code

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## 2.1 Overview

- *Block and function summaries*
- Independent **one-time** analysis of blocks and functions
- *Summary* stores data flow result of each unit and can be reused
- We analyze data flow between connected units *backwards-directed*

```
1  function getCookie() {
2      if(isset($_COOKIE['text'])) {
3          $cookie = $_COOKIE['text'];
4          $s = $cookie;
5      }
6      else {
7          $cookie = null;
8          $s = $cookie;
9      }
10     return $s;
11 }
12
13 $c = getCookie();
```

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function getCookie()  
  
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```
function getCookie()
```

```
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```

```
    $s = null;
```

```
10    return $s;
```

```
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- *Summary* stores data flow result of each unit and can be reused
- We analyze data flow between connected units *backwards-directed*

```
function getCookie()
```

```
return ($_COOKIE['text'] | null)
```

```
13 $c = getCookie();
```

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## 2.2 Challenge: OOP

- No prototype in related work supports object-oriented PHP code analysis
- Object-oriented code disallows *independent* analysis of units

```
1  class UserInput {
2      public function __construct() {
3          $this->c = $_COOKIE['test'];
4      }
5      public function get() {
6          return $this->c;
7      }
8  }
9
10 $input = new UserInput(); ←
11 if(is_object($input)) {
12     $c = $input->get(); ←
13 }
```


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- **Our approach:** Assist *backwards-directed* data flow analysis with *forwards-directed* data propagation

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- For full details, please refer to our paper


```
1 class UserInput {
2     public function __construct() {
3         $this->c = $_COOKIE;
4     }
5     public function get($key) {
6         return $this->c[$key];
7     }
8 }
9
10 $input = new UserInput();
11 if(is_object($input)) {
12     $c = $input->get('test');
13 }
```

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## 2.3 POI Analysis

- Regular backwards-directed *taint analysis* for `unserialize()`
- If argument is resolved to user input, report POI vulnerability



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- Vulnerable `unserialize()` call returns *flagged* object


```
1  $cookie = $_COOKIE['text'];
2  ...
3  $s = base64_decode($cookie);
4  ...
5  $object = unserialize($s);
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
```

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- Vulnerable `unserialize()` call returns *flagged* object
- Propagate *flagged* object forwards-directed



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- Regular backwards-directed *taint analysis* for `unserialize()`
- If argument is resolved to user input, report POI vulnerability
- Vulnerable `unserialize()` call returns *flagged* object
- Propagate *flagged* object forwards-directed
- All properties are tainted

```
1  $cookie = $_COOKIE['text'];
2  ...
3  $s = base64_decode($cookie);
4  ...
5  $object = unserialize($s);
6
7
8
9  $object
10
11
12  echo $object->data;
13
```





## 2.4 Inter-procedural Analysis

- If *receiver* can be determined, analyze distinct method

```
1 class TempFile {
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3         $this->shutdown();
4     }
5     public function shutdown() {
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7     }
8 }
```

```
1 class Process {
2     public function close() {
3         system('kill ' . $this->pid);
4     }
5 }
```

```
1 class Database {
2     public function close() {
3         mysql_close($this->link);
4     }
5 }
```

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
## 2.4 Inter-procedural Analysis

- If *receiver* can be determined, analyze distinct method
- Otherwise, combine analysis for equally named methods

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1 class TempFile { $this->handle->pid
2     public function __destruct() {
3         $this->shutdown();
4     } $this->handle->pid
5     public function shutdown() {
6         $this->handle->close();
7     }
8 }
```

```
1 class Process { $this->pid
2     public function close() {
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1 class Database {
2     public function close() {
3         mysql_close($this->link);
4     }
5 }
```

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## 2.5 Magic Method Invocation

- Automatically invoke analysis for all `__destruct()` and `__wakeup()` methods
- *Flagged* object is *receiver*
- Sensitive properties trigger *POP gadget chain* report which is attached to the POI report

```
1  $cookie = $_COOKIE['text'];
2  ...
3  $s = base64_decode($cookie);
4  ...
5  $object = unserialize($s);
6
7
8
9
10 $object
11
12
13
```

The diagram illustrates the flow of data in a PHP script. Line 5 shows the assignment of the result of `unserialize($s)` to the variable `$object`. A dashed arrow points from this `$object` to another `$object` variable on line 9, indicating that the object is being passed to another part of the code.

## 2.5 Magic Method Invocation

- Automatically invoke analysis for all `__destruct()` and `__wakeup()` methods
- *Flagged* object is *receiver*
- Sensitive properties trigger *POP gadget chain* report which is attached to the POI report
- Trigger other magic methods when propagated *flagged* object is used in related events

```
1  $cookie = $_COOKIE['text'];
2  ...
3  $s = base64_decode($cookie);
4  ...
5  $object = unserialize($s);
6
7
8
9
10 $object
11
12 if(isset($object)) {
13     ...
14 }
```

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```
siteLanguage'] = $GLOB  
GLOBALS['elan'] = $eln;  
tracking'] == "session"  
language_subdomain'] ==  
: elseif($eln = $slng  
$slng = new ]  
lan'] = $pref  
tracking'] == "session"  
language_subdomain'] ==  
: $pref['siteLanguage
```



## 3. Evaluation



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## 3.1 Selected CVE

CVE	Software	Version	POI	Chains
CVE-2014-2294	Open Web Analytics	1.5.6	1	0
CVE-2014-1860	Contao CMS	3.2.4	3	3
CVE-2014-0334	CMS Made Simple	1.11.9	1	0
CVE-2013-7034	LiveZilla	5.1.2.0	1	0
CVE-2013-4338	Wordpress	3.5.1	1	0
CVE-2013-3528	Vanilla Forums	2.0.18.5	2	1
CVE-2013-2225	GLPI	0.83.9	1	0
CVE-2013-1465	CubeCart	5.2.0	1	1
CVE-2013-1453	Joomla!	3.0.2	1	2
CVE-2009-4137	Piwik	0.4.5	1	3

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## 3.2 POI Detection

CVE	Software	Version	POI	Chains
CVE-2014-2294	Open Web Analytics	1.5.6	1 -1	0
CVE-2014-1860	Contao CMS	3.2.4	+16 3	3
CVE-2014-0334	CMS Made Simple	1.11.9	1	0
CVE-2013-7034	LiveZilla	5.1.2.0	+1 1	0
CVE-2013-4338	Wordpress	3.5.1	1 -1	0
CVE-2013-3528	Vanilla Forums	2.0.18.5	2	1
CVE-2013-2225	GLPI	0.83.9	+14 1	0
CVE-2013-1465	CubeCart	5.2.0	1	1
CVE-2013-1453	Joomla!	3.0.2	+1 1	2
CVE-2009-4137	Piwik	0.4.5	1	3

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## 3.2 POI Detection

CVE	Software	Version	POI	Chains
CVE-2014-1860	Contao CMS	3.2.4	+16 3	3
CVE-2013-7034	LiveZilla	5.1.2.0	+1 1	0
CVE-2013-2225	GLPI	0.83.9	+14 1	0
CVE-2013-1453	Joomla!	3.0.2	+1 1	2

- New POI vulnerabilities in *Contao*, *LiveZilla*, and *GLPI* are already fixed
- New POI vulnerability in *Joomla!* lead to RCE until version 3.3.4 (**CVE-2014-7228**)<sup>1</sup>

CVE	Software	Version	POI	Chains
CVE-2014-2294	Open Web Analytics	1.5.6	1 -1	0
CVE-2013-4338	Wordpress	3.5.1	1 -1	0

- False negatives due to *reflection* (OWA) or complex *second-order* data flow (Wordpress)
- No false positives

<sup>1</sup> <http://websec.wordpress.com/2014/10/05/joomla-3-3-4-akeeba-kickstart-remote-code-execution-cve-2014-7228/>

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## 3.3 POP Chain Detection

CVE	Software	Version	IGadgets	Chains		
CVE-2014-2294	Open Web Analytics	1.5.6	24	+9	0	
CVE-2014-1860	Contao CMS	3.2.4	136	+11	3	
CVE-2014-0334	CMS Made Simple	1.11.9	41	+1	0	
CVE-2013-7034	LiveZilla	5.1.2.0	21		0	
CVE-2013-4338	Wordpress	3.5.1	41		0	
CVE-2013-3528	Vanilla Forums	2.0.18.5	14		1	-1
CVE-2013-2225	GLPI	0.83.9	77		0	
CVE-2013-1465	CubeCart	5.2.0	47	+2	1	
CVE-2013-1453	Joomla!	3.0.2	73	+3	2	
CVE-2009-4137	Piwik	0.4.5	111	+2	3	-1

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## 3.3 POP Chain Detection

CVE	Software	Version	IGadgets	Chains	
CVE-2014-2294	Open Web Analytics	1.5.6	24	+9	0
CVE-2014-0334	CMS Made Simple	1.11.9	41	+1	0
CVE-2013-1465	CubeCart	5.2.0	47	+2	1
CVE-2013-1453	Joomla!	3.0.2	73	+3	2

- New chains **define** severity of known POI, e.g., SQLi in OWA, File Delete in *CMSMadeSimple*
- New chains **refine** severity of known POI, e.g., Local File Inclusion in *Joomla!*<sup>1</sup>

CVE	Software	Version	IGadgets	Chains		
CVE-2013-3528	Vanilla Forums	2.0.18.5	14		1	-1
CVE-2009-4137	Piwik	0.4.5	111	+2	3	-1

- False negative due to imprecise framework analysis
- 10 false positives due to dynamic class invocation

<sup>1</sup> <http://websec.wordpress.com/2014/10/03/joomla-3-0-2-poi-cve-2013-1453-gadget-chains/>

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```
sitelanguage'] = $GLOB  
_GLOBALS['elan'] = $eln;  
tracking'] == "session")  
language_subdomain'] ==  
; elseif($eln = $slng  
392: $slng = new la  
_GLOBALS['elan'] = $pref[  
tracking'] == "session")  
language_subdomain'] ==  
: $pref['sitelanguage
```

## 4. Conclusion

## 4. Conclusion

- Code reuse attacks are not only a threat for memory corruption
- We studied the nature of POI and POP in PHP
- We proposed and implemented an automated approach for detection
- We found previously unknown POI vulnerabilities
- We found new POP chains that determine the severity of a POI
- False positives and negatives can occur by imprecise analysis of dynamic OOP features
- Avoid `serialize()/unserialize()`, use `json_encode()/json_decode()`

# Questions ?

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# **Code Reuse Attacks in PHP: Automated POP Chain Generation**

**Thank you!**  
**Enjoy the conference.**